I violently agree that civilian leadership bears the responsibility for designing and executing grand strategy. Doing this is politically risky, since one has to translate general goals into specific actions, programs and guidance. If you define specific goals, then you risk not achieving them… which political leaders want to avoid. So they avoid giving well-defined goals to the military. Political leadership avoids even clearly stating the political end for which they’re fighting.

This ultimately leads to the situation you describe, where political leaders get general compliance from the military without giving it clear guidance, meaning that there are no clear standards for holding GOs accountable and - thus - no firings.

Also, Dunlap is a lawyer by trade, and an airpower ethusiast par excellence. Virtually everything he has written has been to magnify the virtues of Airpower theory. This seems to be his frame of reference, rather than the wars we are currently fighting.

Thank you for coming by and contributing. Good stuff.

I agree that military and diplomatic history have atrophied in Western education (see this post [1], for example), with profound consequences for our civil discourse and civilian leadership.

cheers,
W

[1] http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/08/27/vdh-on-military-history-and-academia/

I’m not sure we’re ever going to really going to get to the bottom of this, because there is such thing as a miilitary profession and the political masters of the military are usually amateurs in the true sense of the word.

Indeed, this amateurism is only increasing as even basic topics relating to understanding the military are being removed from the modern, liberal education. Military and diplomatic histories aren’t taught anymore, or if they are, they are considered a mere adjunct the modern liberal education.

Today, the only way one can get the requisite education for understanding, let alone leading, the military is by serving in the military, or by working in the national security think thanks. But by doing the second option, we are held hostage to groups in institutions like the Project for the New American Century (which did much instigating for OIF I).

I cite as the main factor of amateurish civilian leadership is the pure lack of education on security issues.

The agony of Wahhabism is it’s cycle of self defeat. You’d think a decade of Taliban rule in Afghanistan would be enough writing on the wall for anyone hoping for a return of Islams golden era. Especially considering the “first wave” of nihilist foot soldiers to join AQ were generally well educated and of fairly well to do economic backgrounds.