Opposed Systems Design Comments http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com Strategy, Systems Thinking and Military Affairs. Sat, 07 Nov 2009 07:47:01 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=1.5.1-alpha by: Wiggins http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/11/06/iranian-nuke-warhead-design/#comment-558 Fri, 06 Nov 2009 15:55:37 +0000 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/11/06/iranian-nuke-warhead-design/#comment-558 Roy, There are several potential answers. 1. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is dangerous, so we should limit it. It is plausible that the risk of a nuke being accidentally detonated increases as a function of how many nukes are in the world; therefore it makes sense to limit their spread. 2. There is an international law argument to be made that Iran, by flouting the NPT, undermines the stabilizing role these institutions play. 3. Iran becoming a nuclear power could spark a spasm of nuclear proliferation as Egypt and Saudi Arabia seek their own deterrent. There are some arguments that immature nuclear forces are more dangerous than mature ones since all the safeguards and C2 procedures haven't been implemented yet. Thus, three new nuclear powers all jockeying for prestige while they work the kinks out of their arsenals is concerning. 4. Possessing nuclear weapons could embolden Iran to make life even more difficult for us because it would feel secure from any major military strikes. Side note - you seem to be applying an oddly one-sided realist perspective to all this. If it's reasonable that Iran would want nukes, why isn't it reasonable that the existing powers wouldn't want to stop them? I'm not unsympathetic to your question, but Barnett gives a better argument for why we shouldn't be stressing ourselves over Iran becoming a nuclear power. [1] cheers, W [1] http://www.esquire.com/the-side/opinion/ESQ0205BUSHADA_90 Roy,

There are several potential answers.

1. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is dangerous, so we should limit it. It is plausible that the risk of a nuke being accidentally detonated increases as a function of how many nukes are in the world; therefore it makes sense to limit their spread.

2. There is an international law argument to be made that Iran, by flouting the NPT, undermines the stabilizing role these institutions play.

3. Iran becoming a nuclear power could spark a spasm of nuclear proliferation as Egypt and Saudi Arabia seek their own deterrent. There are some arguments that immature nuclear forces are more dangerous than mature ones since all the safeguards and C2 procedures haven’t been implemented yet. Thus, three new nuclear powers all jockeying for prestige while they work the kinks out of their arsenals is concerning.

4. Possessing nuclear weapons could embolden Iran to make life even more difficult for us because it would feel secure from any major military strikes.

Side note - you seem to be applying an oddly one-sided realist perspective to all this. If it’s reasonable that Iran would want nukes, why isn’t it reasonable that the existing powers wouldn’t want to stop them?

I’m not unsympathetic to your question, but Barnett gives a better argument for why we shouldn’t be stressing ourselves over Iran becoming a nuclear power. [1]

cheers,
W

[1] http://www.esquire.com/the-side/opinion/ESQ0205BUSHADA_90

]]> by: Ray http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/11/06/iranian-nuke-warhead-design/#comment-557 Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:33:56 +0000 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/11/06/iranian-nuke-warhead-design/#comment-557 Question: What is the problem with Iran having nuclear power? If the uS, Israel, Pakistan, etc. have it, why not Iran? Is this just a case of the "more powerful" ganging up on someone they don't like? From what I understand, Iran (or Persia) has not invaded a country for 200 years. Compare that to the US and Israel... Question:

What is the problem with Iran having nuclear power? If the uS, Israel, Pakistan, etc. have it, why not Iran? Is this just a case of the “more powerful” ganging up on someone they don’t like? From what I understand, Iran (or Persia) has not invaded a country for 200 years. Compare that to the US and Israel…

]]> by: Wiggins http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/22/gold-plating-into-obscurity/#comment-556 Thu, 22 Oct 2009 16:17:28 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/22/gold-plating-into-obscurity/#comment-556 I used to work with a jaded old Cold Warrior who joked that the most efficient way to bankrupt the USSR would have been to fill the Pentagon with all of our classified materials (totally unorganized) and allowed unlimited access to the public for a fee of $20/day. The Soviets would have sent an army of KGB agents in there every day for years trying to make sense of it all until they ran out of money. I used to work with a jaded old Cold Warrior who joked that the most efficient way to bankrupt the USSR would have been to fill the Pentagon with all of our classified materials (totally unorganized) and allowed unlimited access to the public for a fee of $20/day. The Soviets would have sent an army of KGB agents in there every day for years trying to make sense of it all until they ran out of money.

]]> by: jheier http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/22/gold-plating-into-obscurity/#comment-555 Thu, 22 Oct 2009 16:12:25 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/22/gold-plating-into-obscurity/#comment-555 I think the best way to defeat our adversaries is to leave a squadron of F-22's unattended and allow them to be stolen. Just think of training and logisitical nightmare they just acquired along with our latest and greatest technical marvels! I think the best way to defeat our adversaries is to leave a squadron of F-22’s unattended and allow them to be stolen. Just think of training and logisitical nightmare they just acquired along with our latest and greatest technical marvels!

]]> by: Wiggins http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/19/chinese-and-american-training/#comment-554 Tue, 20 Oct 2009 12:43:50 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/19/chinese-and-american-training/#comment-554 ...and if you believe that SOF invented that insight, then you've ingested far more than the lethal dose of Koolaid. ;-) ~W …and if you believe that SOF invented that insight, then you’ve ingested far more than the lethal dose of Koolaid.

;-)

~W

]]> by: whosdat http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/19/chinese-and-american-training/#comment-553 Mon, 19 Oct 2009 13:18:27 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/10/19/chinese-and-american-training/#comment-553 Sounds an awful lot like "Humans are more important than hardware" to me - one of the "SOF Truths." Perhaps you, too, drunk the Koolaid, you just haven't realized it yet. Sounds an awful lot like “Humans are more important than hardware” to me - one of the “SOF Truths.” Perhaps you, too, drunk the Koolaid, you just haven’t realized it yet.

]]> by: Wiggins http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/29/grand-bargaining/#comment-551 Wed, 30 Sep 2009 08:51:47 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/29/grand-bargaining/#comment-551 J, Good points but I expect that the other constituency in DoD that Mahnken described (the group that wants to avoid institutionalizing any SSTR/COIN capabilities) won't stop growing. The key driver here is the budget. When it was growing a good clip, it was easier to punt the decision down the road. That becomes harder as the DoD budget stops growing. ~W J,

Good points but I expect that the other constituency in DoD that Mahnken described (the group that wants to avoid institutionalizing any SSTR/COIN capabilities) won’t stop growing. The key driver here is the budget. When it was growing a good clip, it was easier to punt the decision down the road. That becomes harder as the DoD budget stops growing.

~W

]]> by: J. http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/29/grand-bargaining/#comment-550 Wed, 30 Sep 2009 08:43:07 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/29/grand-bargaining/#comment-550 Good article in JFQ, especially the part about requiring the Pres and NSC to get personally involved in making the transformation happen. But here's the thing - how many years ago did Gates say "yeah, DOD has too much money and State ought to get some" (paraphrasing). Everyone sees the problem, it's existed for at least a decade, and yet no one wants to actually do the hard work of pulling DOD out of the lead seat and forcing State to abandon its failed, passive-aggressive tactic and assume the lead (let alone balancing the two dept budgets). You say that DOD will be a prime advocate for this, but I don't believe it. The military leadership will say, frak it, you guys are still talking and I need to get the mission done, so get out of my way. Short of a massive reorg, State won't change. And then, be sure that Congress will stall the process by bickering over whether Obama is weakening America as a result of pulling "our boys in uniform" back from the edge. Good article in JFQ, especially the part about requiring the Pres and NSC to get personally involved in making the transformation happen. But here’s the thing - how many years ago did Gates say “yeah, DOD has too much money and State ought to get some” (paraphrasing). Everyone sees the problem, it’s existed for at least a decade, and yet no one wants to actually do the hard work of pulling DOD out of the lead seat and forcing State to abandon its failed, passive-aggressive tactic and assume the lead (let alone balancing the two dept budgets).

You say that DOD will be a prime advocate for this, but I don’t believe it. The military leadership will say, frak it, you guys are still talking and I need to get the mission done, so get out of my way. Short of a massive reorg, State won’t change. And then, be sure that Congress will stall the process by bickering over whether Obama is weakening America as a result of pulling “our boys in uniform” back from the edge.

]]> by: Tim Stevens http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/24/us-and-uk-crowdsource-strategy-and-doctrine/#comment-549 Thu, 24 Sep 2009 16:16:20 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/24/us-and-uk-crowdsource-strategy-and-doctrine/#comment-549 <em>Interesting experiments and a put-up or shut-up moment for the blogsphere.</em> That's a pretty interesting take on it, and a very good point. I often wonder whether these forms of military 'outreach' achieve as much as they promise, in terms of product for the 'client'. I'm sure my limited experience with such initiatives has left people wondering, 'wtf?'... Interesting experiments and a put-up or shut-up moment for the blogsphere.

That’s a pretty interesting take on it, and a very good point. I often wonder whether these forms of military ‘outreach’ achieve as much as they promise, in terms of product for the ‘client’. I’m sure my limited experience with such initiatives has left people wondering, ‘wtf?’…

]]> by: Wiggins http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/16/china-becomes-a-target-in-iraq/#comment-548 Thu, 17 Sep 2009 13:05:42 +0100 http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2009/09/16/china-becomes-a-target-in-iraq/#comment-548 J. - exactly. J. - exactly.

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