Stratfor offers an interesting, if evidence-free, thought experiment regarding current rumors regarding a devaluation of the ruble (subscription required). The possibility Stratfor considers is whether the US had a role in starting these rumors as an indirect check on Russia’s newly assertive behavior in its periphery. According to this analysis, Russia’s activism has been based on income (largely from commodities), momentum and guts. Stoking fears of ruble devaluation and bank runs would, in theory, weaken all three.
What interests me is less the validity of the story and more what it implies about expectations of American strategic capabilities. We often hear discussions of how much energy the Chinese devote to thinking about unrestricted warfare [pdf], but this example posits that the US could behave in some similarly sneaky ways.
A perverse corollary to the danger of mirror imaging is the danger of assuming others are endlessly more clever than you. One could argue that this isn’t a vice and rather appropriate paranoia. What such a perspective overlooks, however, is that overestimating your enemy’s strength can lead to a distored orientation, just as an inflated view one’s own power can. Overestimating an adversary’s abilities can cause one to miss opportunities to exploit their mistakes - rather like a chess player mistaking an error for a gambit and therefore not exploiting it.
Striking such a balance is difficult, but such is the nature of human competition.
