On the latest leg of Pacific Partnership 2008, USNS Mercy is visiting the Federated States of Micronesia.

The [USNS Mercy] team provided 13 medical civic action programs on 13 different islands and three engineering civic action programs on two islands throughout the Chuuk Lagoon as well as two medical teams to Pohnpei and Yap.

-Pacific Daily News (Guam), August 29, 2008, “USNS Mercy Visits Chuuk On Humanitarian Mission.”

As Barnett often says, we need to trust the Chinese to be Chinese and use that to our advantage. For example, Chinese support for territorial soverignty plays into current American efforts to isolate Russia after its invasion of Georgia. AP story, via Yahoo:

Russia’s hopes of gathering support were dealt a huge blow when the five countries denounced the use of force and called for respect for every country’s territorial integrity. The joint declaration from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization deepens Russia’s international isolation.

Medvedev had appealed to the alliance — which consists of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — for unanimous support of Russia’s response to Georgia’s “aggression.”

Medvedev’s appeal had raised fears in Western capitals of the emergence of a competing strategic alliance to NATO forming around Russia — but the other Asian nations may have been reluctant to strain their relations with Europe and the United States.

Medvedev also discussed the situation in Georgia’s breakaway regions with Chinese President Hu Jintao. China has traditionally been wary of supporting separatist movements, mindful of its own problems with Tibet and Muslims in the western territory of Xinjiang.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang was quoted by state news agency Xinhua as saying “the situation in the region … should be resolved in dialogue.”

Remember this when the concerns about alternative alliance structures become breathless.

Robb has an excellent post up discussing cyberwarfare as a specific instance of open source warfare.

Perhaps the most important point Robb makes is that the best trained cyber-warriors will likely come from the civilian (and, very often, criminal) world. These won’t be employees on the government payroll.

A related theme I’ve expored here in the past regards the role of non-technically skilled participants in these cyberconflicts [1]. Evgeny Morozov offers a compelling account in Slate of just how low the barrier to entry is: you need a pc and an internet connection.

We are left with another bizarre hybred of modern and traditional: nationalist fevor, channeled through IT, to create cyberswarming attacks.

[1] Info Militias and 21st Century People’s War

David Axe, embedded on the USS Kearsarge for its South American humanitarian aid tour, meditates on whether the military ought to be carrying out these sorts of missions.

But Damstra admitted that for many kids, coming aboard Kearsarge for surgery could be a terrifying experience. To help take some of the hard edges off their mission, the Navy is inviting a family member to accompany every surgical patient who comes aboard. That’s a burden on the transports and on the staff who must screen all visitors for tuberculosis, but it’s worth it to put a friendlier face on what is, deep down, still a military operation, albeit one that’s giving out free medicine instead of free ass-kickings.

It was a good answer [Commander David] Damstra [the mission’s senior Navy surgeon] gave me, but it still didn’t settle the issue in my mind. Sure, it’s great that the Pentagon is shifting away from solving all of our security problems with overwhelming firepower. “Soft power” really is a better strategy in many cases –- but it’s still just that: a strategy. Kearsarge isn’t sailing to Puerta Cabezas for the crew’s health or for fun: she’s going to gradually, subtly shape the world in the ways we Americans and our allies want it shaped. This is war by radically different means.

I’m not saying that’s a bad thing. Quite the contrary. But it is something we should be conscious of. And the next time some unfriendly leader like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez points to the Navy’s soft power operations and accuses the U.S. of trying to rule the world, we shouldn’t be surprised.

Axe’s concerns are why Barnett argues that the SysAdmin function (which is precisely what this sort of mission is, as I’ve said before [1]) will ultimately be farmed out of the military. How exactly that will work, and whether the military still ought to have the lead, is an important question (as my recent debate with SE illustrates).

On the one hand is the concern for an overly militarized foreign policy and the counter-productive nature of using grey hulled warships to deliver soft power aid. Related to this is the concern that our soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors will lose their high-end warfighting skills as they devote increasing time to these SysAdmin missions. And, if these missions are going to be successful, they have to be continuing. A long, steady track record of such deeds is the best response to the inevitable criticisms by Chavez, Castro and the like who will argue that the US is just trying to score some drive-by PR points. This is a reason why the USNS Mercy and Comfort are good platforms for these missions, though they lack the helicopters and related organic logistical capacity of the Kearsarge.

On the other hand is the concern that, given the supreme importance of security on these aid missions, we have to maintain military control of these missions. Furthermore, humanitarian missions to some areas require the kind of logistical expertise that, quite frankly, only the military has. This doesn’t mean the military ought to run the show by itself, just that its critical skill set has to be included, meaning that there will be an irreducible military character to any of these missions.

A concluding observation. While we certainly want the White House and the National Security Council to avoid trying to solve all our problems with overwhelming firepower, to what extent is it the DoD’s responsibility to make this happen? In the American foreign policy capability portfolio, the DoD is the big stick. Instead of asking why the stick can’t also feed people and heal their wounds, why aren’t we focusing on why the other elements of the foreign policy portfolio aren’t taking care of these functions. [Pardon the bureucratic jargon, it’s late and I want to get this recorded.]

[1] Previous posts on this theme:
A pure SysAdmin mission
Not, decidedly, a 20th Century arms race
The strategic influence of amphibious assault ships

As the prospects of a US humanitarian intervention in Georgia increase, watch for Georgian President Saakashvili to try to up the ante. Having lost the war with Russia, his only options are to fold or go for a double-or-nothing bet by attempting to get American intervention.

Although direct military intervention is not being considered, Pentagon sources have hinted that a limited number of troops could be deployed on the ground to support what Mr Bush described as a “vigorous and ongoing” humanitarian mission headed by the US military.

He announced that the first US airforce transport aircraft was already on its way and that more would follow. Meanwhile, the Navy was heading to the Black Sea — currently controlled by Russian warships — to deliver humanitarian and medical supplies direct to Georgian ports.

“We expect Russia to honour its commitment to let in all forms of humanitarian assistance,” said Mr Bush. “We expect Russia to ensure that all lines of communication and transport, including sea ports, airports, roads and air space, remain open for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for civilian transit.”

President Saakashvili of Georgia seized on the announcement to claim that Tbilisi airport and Poti port would be placed under US military control, a claim the Pentagon swiftly denied.

Stratfor argues that it is in Georgia’s interest to make it seem that as much of the country is in American control as possible, in order to deter Russia through the threat of escalation.

Among the many spectators of the current Russian-Georgian war are US military analysts looking for indicators of combat effectiveness. One topic that has attracted their attention (and, thus, trade journal coverage) is why Israel was able to penetrate Syria’s Russian-made air defenses last May, yet Russia has remained vulnerable to Georgia’s Russian-made air defenses.

On answer that has been offered can be thought of as the Battlestar Galactica explanation:

There are indications from U.S. analysts that the relative simplicity — meaning far less networking — of the Georgian air defenses made it tougher to knock out the system all at once.

“…The Georgian air defense system is much less networked than that of the Syrians and [therefore relies on] autonomous sector operations,” says [a senior U.S. Air Force officer]. So there’s no way for tactical electronic warfare systems to create massive blind spots. [1]

There are other less exotic alternatives, but this one intrigued me.

[1] David A. Fulghum, “U.S. Ponders Effectiveness Of Georgian Air Defenses,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 13, 2008, Pg. 1.

Follow the Money Contributions to political candidates.

Show the Money Network visualization of the previous data.

Congressional Earmarks Congressional Earmarks

DEW Line’s database of PAC spending by defense contractors

Jonathan Stevenson offers a cogent summary of RAND’s golden age in today’s WSJ [1]:

During that crucial epoch, Rand helped draw a sharp distinction between first-strike and second-strike nuclear deterrence, and the dangerously offense-oriented “brinkmanship” of the 1950s gave way to the more stable defensive posture of “mutual assured destruction.”

Back then, Rand was situated exclusively in Santa Monica, Calif., far away from the churn of day-to-day government policy implementation. It had uniquely broad research and budgeting standards that freed analysts to think outside the box about strategic problems. At the same time, Rand’s official status as a federally funded research and development center afforded its employees high-level security clearances and access to classified information and government officials.

[1] Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2008, Pg. 11, “We Need A New Think Tank For The War On Terror,” By Jonathan Stevenson

On today’s WaPo op-ed page, John Kamm looks at a Pew Research Center polling data and finds a perception gap betwen how the Chinese think the world views China, and how the world actually does. Summarizing the data, Kamm concludes:

Essentially, the people of China think twice as many people in the world like their country as actually do. This isn’t a gap; it’s a chasm. And the information bubble around the Chinese people explains a lot.

A common framework used when making net assessments is to consider adversary perceptions of themselves (so called “red-red” perceptions). Applying this approach to China*, this data indicates that it may have a serious self-perception gap, which has real consequences for its behavior in the international system.

The rest of the framework involves blue-blue perceptions (What is the equivalent gap in American perceptions of its own standing in world opinion?), blue-red and red-blue perceptions. It would be a good exercise to use the open source polling data and this framework to assess the accuracy of American-Chinese perceptions.

*I am apply the framework here, not asserting that China is necessarily an adversary.

Danger Room has a great post about a FOIA-released OSD Net Assessment sponsored study of how ancient empires maintained their military advantage over time. Lots of great links to the original reports.