The central metaphor of Lind’s latest essay mixes several meanings of “linear.” In his usage, “linear” alternatively means:

• “straight fortifications,”
• “physical assets literally positioned in a line,”
• “a tactical and operational concept whereby units form a contiguious front”
• “assuming sequential strategies” (as opposed to cumulative strategies)
• “assuming progress without setbacks”
• “forecasting based on a linear extrapolation of past trends”
• “order” (because apparently non-linearity equates with chaos)

By lumping so many different criticisms under the same concept, Lind turns “linearity” into a vaguely pejorative term describing all that is wrong with the US military. If being linear is bad, then does that mean that being non-linearity would be good? What would a non-linear US military look like?

Lind doesn’t answer this; he only uses non-linear as a description of reality. So what constructive conclusion can one to take away from all this? Given Lind’s ambigious use of the concept of “linearity” the answer could range from “don’t build 19th Century fortification” to “don’t forecast based on linear extrapolations.”

This ambiguity paints Lind into a corner, as his conclusion demonstrates. After finding numerous ways to call the US military linear, his advise reduces to “don’t be linear.”

It will happen from time to time that the chaos shakes out into patterns in which we can see linear progress. But the reality remains chaos, which means the patterns will soon reform into other, quite different shapes. We cannot anticipate what those shapes might be. If we can be quick enough, we may be able to use some of those new shapes, as we have used the unexpected outbreak of fighting between local Sunni militias and al Qaeda. What we must not do, if our orientation is to be accurate, is project these kaleidoscopic pattern shifts in linear terms.

Lind could have started his essay with a call for more accurate orientation, demonstrated the need, and then proposed some methods for actually addressing the problem. Instead, he piles on the problem, using “linear” as a vague and universal criticism that obscures instead of clarifies the way forward.

Richard Pearle’s most recent oped cites Albert Wohlstetter’s 1976 essay “Racing Forward? Or Ambling Back?” (PDF generously posted by Robert at AlbertWohlstetter.com).

One still encounters the claim that arms races become self-sustaining through an action-reaction cycle as nations accumulate more and more weaponry in the attempt to maintain a relative edge over their rivals. Wohlstetter demonstrated that there actual dynamics are far more complex, but this point never seemed to permiate the larger discourse (meaning that classics like this can be a valuable secret weapon in cutting through presentist debates).

Incidentally, the need to understand some of the other factors that governed Soviet strategic investments drove Andy Marshall’s research program into bureaucractic/organizational behavior.

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again…

I love xkcd.