Where’s the Grand Strategy?
Six years after 9/11, where is our Kennan?
I’d push the question back further - sixteen years after the end of the Cold War, where is our Kennan?
While Barnett’s faith in globalization’s continuing march may mirror Kennan’s faith in the relative strength of the Western system over the Soviets, the role of military force in his theory causes the analogy to break. Using Biddle’s dichotomy between containment and rollback, the active role of the Core’s SysAdmin effort to shrink the gap makes Barnett’s strategy one of rollback.
Robb, by contrast, doesn’t offer a grand strategy at all. His recommendations are operational and tactical, reflecting the scope of his analysis. He forecasts the rise of microstates as a prediction, not as a goal. Besides, as I’ve said before, Robb’s work complements Barnett’s (and vice versa). [1] [2]
For a truly alternative grand strategy, one would have to look to something like William Lind’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Lind advocates distancing the United States from sources of disorder to protect and grow its strength, making his strategy one of containment.
Wiggins,
From Linds SDI:
“In simple terms, this means we would leave centers and sources of disorder alone militarily (and in other ways) unless they attacked us. But if they attacked us, our response would be Roman, which is to say annihilating.”
Isn’t this something of a paradox? Wouldn’t annihilatory reactions divide or isolate the US from the “centers of order” that we should, via Lind, concentrate on even if such a retaliation is affected as a “spasm?”
Comment by subadei — October 18, 2007 @ 8:11 pm
This is a great question! I’m writing an article on this, with attribution & link to you of course.
Here is a quick note: perhaps we already have our Kennan. His name is David Kilcullen. See the following for a comparison and contrast:
America takes another step towards the “Long War”
Http://www.defense-and-society.org/fabius/long_war_I.htm
Boyd talks quite a bit about strategy. Here is a five part series proposing a Grand Strategy for America, based on Boyd’s concepts. Scroll down to see it. I interrupted it, for reasons I will discuss in my article (to be continued someday, God willing).
http://www.defense-and-society.org/fabius/fabius_archive.htm
Comment by Fabius Maximus — October 19, 2007 @ 12:36 am
Forgot to note: the first link, on Kilcullen/Kennan, is the first in a series on our new long war. Not on the level of Kennan’s writings, for sure. Now on part 8. The archive has links to the other parts, for any interested.
Comment by Fabius Maximus — October 19, 2007 @ 12:39 am
Subadei,
I cited Lind’s SDI as an alternative strategic vision. I am not endorsing it.
The retaliatory “spasms” of the SDI do pose a serious problem. Lind advocates withdrawing from the Gap in order to firewall American off from its disorder. Yet when these sources of disorder attack us, we need to annihilate them… but who do we annihilate? The spasm must be accurately aimed, otherwise we simply produce new enemies to join the original attackers.
Retaliatory spasms would require excellent actionable intelligence for directing our strikes. This is already a challenge today. Leaving Gap locations (where terrorists train and plot) alone will only make the job harder.
Intelligent adversaries will compound the problem by attempting to provoke reprisal strikes upon residential areas, in order to create anti-American rage over the blood-thirsty attacks that killed innocent civilians.
The promise of annihilating retaliation makes for good rhetoric but unimplementable strategy.
cheers,
Wiggins
Comment by Wiggins — October 19, 2007 @ 1:12 am
FM,
I’m curious how you’d propose to implement this strategy.
cheers,
Wiggins
Comment by Wiggins — October 19, 2007 @ 1:15 am
Exactly — as usual, you go right to the heart of the matter. There is little writing about Grand Strategy because it is a genre of fantasy. Unless you are inside the system, like Kilcullen or Kennan. It’s not unlike the op-eds we see in newspapers: “An open letter to President Bush.” As if he will read it and say — “Oh, good idea, let’s do this!”
My Grand Stategy articles are supporting context for the more useful works criticizing our actual Strategy.
BTW: as my article about Kilcullen and the Long War describes, America has adopted an “alternative” strategy, one quite different from anything previous in US history. It’s imperative that we convey this news — and implications! — to as many as possible.
That’s the point of my current series. Comments and corrections on these greatly appreciated!
Comment by Fabius Maximus — October 19, 2007 @ 9:10 am
FM,
That doesn’t answer the question. Given the issues Subadei and I raise, is it possible to implement Lind’s SDI?
Cheers,
Wiggins
Comment by Wiggins — October 19, 2007 @ 10:43 am
If you don’t consider “a genre of fantasy” to mean “impossible to implement”, then you are surfing the wrong web sites. Upgrade your fantasies!
Comment by Fabius Maximus — October 19, 2007 @ 8:08 pm
Here are excerpts from some of my articles, more detailed answers to your question.
1. Lind’s SDI is a brilliant, thought provoking collection of ideas about strategy, but not a strategy. His ideas range from ones with which I strongly agree (defense, not offense is the winning play in 4GW) to ones I consider impossible (isolation from disorder, freeing ourselves from “Arab” oil). Some are not elements of geo-pol strategy, but about core American values (multiculturalism).
2. Much of 4GW writing – like RMA theory in general – is fantasy b/ it does not explain how to implement it. Like “strategic corporals” they are great ideas but divorced from our actual forces.
This was the downfall of Barnett’s vision, ignoring the gap b/ the forces he described as necessary to implement his blueprint and what we actually have. The result: Iraq.
3. What c/b implemented today is not much. The best option imho is to go with Donald Vandergriff’s reforms. This is not strategy per se, but can over time (likely a long time) create a force able to implement a wider range of strategy than with today’s blunt instruments.
4. The missing element imho is the desire for change, the perceived need.
Comment by Fabius Maximus — October 19, 2007 @ 8:25 pm
FM,
Thank you for clarifying your perspective on Lind’s SDI.
cheers,
Wiggins
Comment by Wiggins — October 20, 2007 @ 4:39 pm