Finished Clausewitz last night. Here are some scatter-shot notes from my reading.

Book I, Chapter I:
Clausewitz’s solution to the problem of why pauses occur in war (which theory implies should never occur in absolute war) involves viewing war as a “series of successive acts,” which can each have different dynamics. This is like the game theoretic practice of taking a single-move game and repeating it to make a multi-stage game. Take, for example, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Moving from a single to a multi-stage game can “moderate” the result. Specifically, the multi-stage game allows additional strategies that lead to an increase in overall payoffs (hence a “better” outcome) in equilibrium. In both cases, repeated interaction allows new dynamics to emerge that lead to a less severe outcome.

pp82-3
Clausewitz discusses why hostile forces sometimes choose to wait instead of engaging the enemy. He reasons that a desire to wait for a better moment for action restrains them, yet this desire should only be present in one side at a time. The ending of a game of go actually serves as an elegant illustration of this reasoning. If neither side feel the need to take further action (which each player indicates by passing, or declining to take a move), then the game ends. Clausewitz points out that the discussion assumes that both players understand the situation perfectly. Of course, in real life, they don’t and most (all?) of go is devoted to the process of discovering who understands the situation better. Inaction (or passing or gote moves) can arise out of accurate assessments of a settled situation (or a rare situation where there are no better moves available for one side). However, naction can also arise from error in understanding the situation.

p88
Identifying the “type” of war involved in and not attempting to turn it into something alien to its nature means aligning ends and means. It requires one to not fall prey to Ikle’s warning about starting war without a plan for its ending - specifically, the political endstate that the nation’s leaders hope to achieve.

Book I, Chapter II
p97
decision by arms : operations :: cash payment : commerce

p99
The danger of indirect stratagems. Miyamoto Musashi was a master swordsman first, and he took great pains to emphasize that for all his thinking, the aim of the duel is to kill your opponent. Anything that you do not directly related to this is folly.

Book I Chapter VII
p119
War may appear simple, but even the simplest thing becomes difficult. Reminds me of Into Thin Air. Most every element involved in summiting Everest looks simple, yet every step is difficult.
Also, Clausewitz starting thinking about friction after witnessing the mistakes caused by tension and fear during the Napoleonic wars. He watched the consequences of men being subjected to an atmosphere of threatening ambiguity, and remembered the experience well.

Book II Chapter II
Clausewitz’s thoughts on numerical superiority apply equally well to the challenges of current methods of quantitative analysis in military operations research and systems analysis. What may be acceptable measures for temporary analysis of an isolated factor can become an attempt to reduce the entirety of warfare to the formula of numerical superiority, or rate of fire, or digital connectivity.