Got around to reading Laurence Iannaccone’s The Market for Martyrs. Iannaccone makes a compelling case, based on the academic literature, for why it is incorrect to view suicide terrorist and the organizations that manage them as irrational, mentally stunted or economically destitute. Drawing a compelling comparison to fears about the rise of cults and fringe religious groups brainwashing converts during the 1970s, he argues that suicide terrorism and participation in religiously-motivated global insurgent movements depends not on brainwashing but rather on social ties.

One theme that I would have like to see Iannaccone develop further is why healthy, relatively prosperous and well-educated people with relatively few or weak social ties are more likely to join these sorts of movements. I contend that they are seeking the close social bonds and sense of belonging that forms an essential part of feeling secure and happy in one’s life. Being social creatures, we cannot thrive on material comforts alone. The global Salafi militant movement leverages the sense of social isolation experienced by populations encountering the unsettlingly rapid and impersonal pace of change brought about by globalization. Since they only need to pull in a tiny fraction of all of those who feel this way, trying to eliminate the supply side of global Salafi militants is not feasible.

Iannaccone’s ultimate policy recommendation - changing market conditions so that religious organizations that create demand for suicide attackers will have to compete with other more moderate religious organizations that do not act on violent rhetoric - completely aligns with this further detail. When one drills down to this resolution, it illustrates why more competition addresses the underlying dynamic of people struggling to find their way in an impersonal and disorienting world of material prosperity and disruptive change. When Tyler Durden isn’t the only way an isolated young man with few social ties has to find meaning in his life, then Project Mayham faces stiffer competition for recruits. Exactly the sort of systemic change we’re looking for.

Some other nuggets I clipped as I read:

Belief typically follows involvement. Strong attachments draw people into religious groups, but strong beliefs develop more slowly or never develop at all.

Ties nicely in with Marc Sageman’s work exploring the central role social bonds (and not belief) play in global Salafi militant recruitment.

Supply of killers: Sadly, the basic supply of labor is readily available. Many people can be induced to steal, riot, vandalize, kill, or commit acts other acts of violence, protest, and civil disobedience. Indeed, societies devote substantial effort to limit the voluntary supply of such activities. Increased risk of capture, injury, or death certainly tends to reduce supply, but keep in mind that the number called upon to die is very small relative to the total number working for the firm. Ex ante, the typical worker may face risks no greater than those endured by most criminals or war-time soldiers.

Can’t make the goal being ending all human-vs-human violence.

Terrorist firms can function effectively even if the supply of suicide-killers is extremely small. Even a few successful suicide bombings can cause widespread terror.

Again, why eliminating the supply side is infeasible.

Team production: Costs and complexity are further increased by the need to obtain workers able to kill and willing to die. One cannot hire such people as one does office clerks, or even contract killers. They must be “produced” through a social process that involves recruitment, interaction, and training. Tremendous effort is required to build commitment, maintain obedience, and prevent defection. With greater sacrifice comes more selective recruiting, more intense training, and more extensive group activity. Not just any group structure will suffice. Successful groups have strong rules, strong social boundaries, strong sanctions for disobedience, and strong leadership hierarchies.

I need to think more on this. In a networked insurgent movement like al Qaeda, the way that commitment, obedience and cohesion is maintained is through the movement’s shared narrative. Not sure to what degree this aligns with what Innaccone lays out here.