When a pair of thinkers as diverse as Thomas Barnett and William Lind agree on something, you know you’ve found an idea that creates some serious traction. Such is the case in Lind’s recent article examining how to win in Iraq. A negotiated American-Iranian settlement regarding Iraq’s status sits at the center of Lind’s plan. Lind draws an elegant comparison between Nixon’s strategic masterstroke and the diplomatic settlement Bush should make with Iran:

In the case of the war in Iraq, Iran is China, and the first component of a strategy to win in Iraq is to establish a rapprochement with Iran. That is, a general settlement of differences. The Iranians have offered us such a settlement—including a compromise on the nuclear issue—on generous terms. But the Bush administration, true to its hubris, refused to consider it, going so far as to upbraid the Swiss for daring to forward the overture to us. It seems, however, to remain on the table.

The reason a strategy to win in Iraq must begin with a rapprochement with Iran is that any real Iraqi state is likely to be allied to Iran. Even the quisling al-Maliki government cowering in the Green Zone is close to Iran. A legitimate Iraqi government, which is virtually certain to be dominated by Iraq’s Shi’ites, will probably be much closer.

A restored Iraqi state that is allied with Iran will quickly roll up al-Qaeda and other non-state forces in Iraq, which is the victory we most require. But the world’s perception will still be that the United States was defeated because its main regional rival, Iran, will emerge much strengthened. If Iran and America are no longer enemies, that issue becomes moot.

A rapprochement with Iran may encourage Tehran to use its influence in Iraq to promote the revival of a state, but that is in Iran’s interest in any case once it is clear American troops are withdrawing. Conversely, until it is clear that America has given up its ambitions for large, permanent military bases in Iraq, Iran must continue to promote instability in its neighbor.

Barnett also used the Nixon-to-Tehran metaphor when he first published a description of his plan for a diplomatic settlement with Iran:

You and I both know Nixon would have inevitably headed to Tehran by now, absent 9/11 and your subsequent Axis of Evil speech…

Our offer should be both simple and bold. I would send James Baker, our last good secretary of state, to Tehran as your special envoy with the following message: “We know you’re getting the bomb, and we know there isn’t much we can do about it right now unless we’re willing to go up-tempo right up the gut. But frankly, there’s other fish we want to fry, so here’s the deal: You can have the bomb, and we’ll take you off the Axis of Evil list, plus we’ll re-establish diplomatic ties and open up trade. But in exchange, not only will you bail us out on Iraq first and foremost by ending your support of the insurgency, you’ll also cut off your sponsorship of Hezbollah and other anti-Israeli terrorist groups, help us bully Syria out of Lebanon, finally recognize Israel, and join us in guaranteeing the deal on a permanent Palestinian state. You want to be recognized as the regional player of note. We’re prepared to do that. But that’s the price tag. Pay it now or get ready to rumble.”

Thus, we have two influential thinkers agreeing on the basic parameters of the central bargain necessary for a more stable Iraq. I can only hope that this is indicative of a rising tide of support for such a deal, and that we’ll find ourselves in 2041 looking back on another strategic coup.

Deichmans has an elegant post discussing the relationship between large numbers and strategy.

Too often we overlook the dynamics of our complex world, and we tend to dramatically underestimate variance in subsequent effects of actions.

So, if someone suggests to you that they can predict future actions in, say, a battlefield, just remember these facts:

The number of chess moves after a 40-move game is 1E120
The fastest computers in the world process about 1E15 operations per second
There are 1E80 particles in the visible universe

We still can’t predict the weather accurately — and nature isn’t trying to deceive us!

Furthermore, in chess we can completely enumerate the possible moves available to each player. Predicting future actions in an unconstrained competitive environment - like a battlefield - requires one to predict innovation. The choice of chess as the representative game is quite apt, since in many ways it reflects the the conventional force-on-force attritional mindset of much of American military power. Adversaries look at American aptitude in this area and - surprise, surprise - decide to play a different game that better suits their own aptitudes. So a complete enumeration of possible moves would have to include all the possible different games adversaries could introduce… which, in turn, depends upon a complex feedback loop between American moves and adversary moves.

All of which reinforces Deichmans’ point.

Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, leader of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, died yesterday at 85.

Between Meshkini’s death and the reportedly poor health of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, there will be some serious maneuvering to see who can seize the reins of power. The question is whether reformist elements like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani will gain power. This will have significant implications for US-Iranian negotiations over Iraq. But, as with everything relating to these negotiations, the multiple timelines and convoluted cast of back-channel players makes it difficult to keep a clear picture of what’s happening and why.