When a pair of thinkers as diverse as Thomas Barnett and William Lind agree on something, you know you’ve found an idea that creates some serious traction. Such is the case in Lind’s recent article examining how to win in Iraq. A negotiated American-Iranian settlement regarding Iraq’s status sits at the center of Lind’s plan. Lind draws an elegant comparison between Nixon’s strategic masterstroke and the diplomatic settlement Bush should make with Iran:

In the case of the war in Iraq, Iran is China, and the first component of a strategy to win in Iraq is to establish a rapprochement with Iran. That is, a general settlement of differences. The Iranians have offered us such a settlement—including a compromise on the nuclear issue—on generous terms. But the Bush administration, true to its hubris, refused to consider it, going so far as to upbraid the Swiss for daring to forward the overture to us. It seems, however, to remain on the table.

The reason a strategy to win in Iraq must begin with a rapprochement with Iran is that any real Iraqi state is likely to be allied to Iran. Even the quisling al-Maliki government cowering in the Green Zone is close to Iran. A legitimate Iraqi government, which is virtually certain to be dominated by Iraq’s Shi’ites, will probably be much closer.

A restored Iraqi state that is allied with Iran will quickly roll up al-Qaeda and other non-state forces in Iraq, which is the victory we most require. But the world’s perception will still be that the United States was defeated because its main regional rival, Iran, will emerge much strengthened. If Iran and America are no longer enemies, that issue becomes moot.

A rapprochement with Iran may encourage Tehran to use its influence in Iraq to promote the revival of a state, but that is in Iran’s interest in any case once it is clear American troops are withdrawing. Conversely, until it is clear that America has given up its ambitions for large, permanent military bases in Iraq, Iran must continue to promote instability in its neighbor.

Barnett also used the Nixon-to-Tehran metaphor when he first published a description of his plan for a diplomatic settlement with Iran:

You and I both know Nixon would have inevitably headed to Tehran by now, absent 9/11 and your subsequent Axis of Evil speech…

Our offer should be both simple and bold. I would send James Baker, our last good secretary of state, to Tehran as your special envoy with the following message: “We know you’re getting the bomb, and we know there isn’t much we can do about it right now unless we’re willing to go up-tempo right up the gut. But frankly, there’s other fish we want to fry, so here’s the deal: You can have the bomb, and we’ll take you off the Axis of Evil list, plus we’ll re-establish diplomatic ties and open up trade. But in exchange, not only will you bail us out on Iraq first and foremost by ending your support of the insurgency, you’ll also cut off your sponsorship of Hezbollah and other anti-Israeli terrorist groups, help us bully Syria out of Lebanon, finally recognize Israel, and join us in guaranteeing the deal on a permanent Palestinian state. You want to be recognized as the regional player of note. We’re prepared to do that. But that’s the price tag. Pay it now or get ready to rumble.”

Thus, we have two influential thinkers agreeing on the basic parameters of the central bargain necessary for a more stable Iraq. I can only hope that this is indicative of a rising tide of support for such a deal, and that we’ll find ourselves in 2041 looking back on another strategic coup.

Deichmans has an elegant post discussing the relationship between large numbers and strategy.

Too often we overlook the dynamics of our complex world, and we tend to dramatically underestimate variance in subsequent effects of actions.

So, if someone suggests to you that they can predict future actions in, say, a battlefield, just remember these facts:

The number of chess moves after a 40-move game is 1E120
The fastest computers in the world process about 1E15 operations per second
There are 1E80 particles in the visible universe

We still can’t predict the weather accurately — and nature isn’t trying to deceive us!

Furthermore, in chess we can completely enumerate the possible moves available to each player. Predicting future actions in an unconstrained competitive environment - like a battlefield - requires one to predict innovation. The choice of chess as the representative game is quite apt, since in many ways it reflects the the conventional force-on-force attritional mindset of much of American military power. Adversaries look at American aptitude in this area and - surprise, surprise - decide to play a different game that better suits their own aptitudes. So a complete enumeration of possible moves would have to include all the possible different games adversaries could introduce… which, in turn, depends upon a complex feedback loop between American moves and adversary moves.

All of which reinforces Deichmans’ point.

Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, leader of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, died yesterday at 85.

Between Meshkini’s death and the reportedly poor health of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, there will be some serious maneuvering to see who can seize the reins of power. The question is whether reformist elements like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani will gain power. This will have significant implications for US-Iranian negotiations over Iraq. But, as with everything relating to these negotiations, the multiple timelines and convoluted cast of back-channel players makes it difficult to keep a clear picture of what’s happening and why.

…the venerable Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) loop is no longer viable for an information-age military.

That sums up why I find so much of net-centric theory to be irrelevent. Throwing out wheels and replacing them with sleds.

I’m too frustrated to spend a Friday afternoon fully explicating why the Deep Green account of the OODA loop is wrong. In brief, it ignores the implicit guidance and control aspects (as Dr. Richards has pointed out, they are truly the most powerful part of the OODA model) and reduces OODA to a sequential step process.

“Climate change, and the resulting shortage of ecological resources, could be to blame for armed conflicts in the future, according to David Zhang from University of Hong Kong and colleagues.” Zhang’s research found that rises in warfare in eastern China correlated with drops in temperature: “Almost all peaks of warfare and dynastic changes coincided with cold phases.” Zhang’s team theorizes that cold spells reduced agricultural output for the pre-industrial societies of the 1000-1911 era studied, leading to violent conflict for the few remaining resources.

One might assume that given this research, Zhang would be optimistic about the likelihood of peace in a warming future. Maybe even a world peace through increased carbon emissions movement would be in order [/sarcasm]. Such an un-pc conclusion would of course be unacceptable, and the article makes sure to state that:

Looking to the future and applying their findings, Zhang and colleagues suggest shortages of essential resources, such as fresh water, agricultural land, energy sources and minerals may trigger more armed conflicts among human societies.

So despite the fact that the research correlates war with colder periods, and recent temperature trends indicate that average global temperatures are warming, we’re still being warned that we may be in for more misery in the future.

This seems backwards to me. The only actual evidence cited correlated increases in warfare with drops in temperature. The most simplistic extrapolation would assume that this relationship would contiue and predict reduced warfare in a warmer future. Yet Zhang asserts the exact opposite.

The more pessimistic forecast depends on the thesis that scarcer resources lead to more conflict. This thesis really needs to tested directly, because I encounter it often and yet the details often get glossed over. In this case, the forcast ignores the difference between pre-industrial and industrial (to say nothing of post-industrial) soceities and changing population dynamics. Previous population booms may have correlated with bumper harvests due to warmer temperatures which then became unsustainable when resource yields shrank due to cold, leading to war. But current population growth has actually declined as societies have become wealthier.

In order to actually test the resource war thesis, one would need a data set that could one could examine for correlations between the availability of key resources and incidents of warfare.

Of course, all of this could be a simply a poor summary by a journalist. I’ll have to track down the actual article [1] to know. Still, very interesting stuff and an awfully elegant research design. Getting a 911 year dataset with 899 incidents is impressive.

[1] Zhang DD, Zhang J, Lee HF, He Y (2007), “Climate change and war frequency in eastern China over the last millennium”, Human Ecology, Volume 35, Number 4 / August, 2007, Pages 403-414, DOI: 10.1007/s10745-007-9115-8

The intel war between Western intelligence agencies and Iran have escalated to a new level. 14 squirrels have been arrested by Iranian operatives on charges of espionage.

Iranian authorities have recently arrested more than a dozen squirrels for espionage.

“In recent weeks, intelligence operatives have arrested 14 squirrels within Iran’s borders,” state-sponsored news agency IRNA reported. “The squirrels were carrying spy gear of foreign agencies, and were stopped before they could act, thanks to the alertness of our intelligence services.”

Iran claims the rodents were being used by Western powers in an attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic.

Iranian police commander Esmaeil Ahmadi-Moqadam confirmed the report, saying that a number of squirrels had been caught bearing foreign spy gear within Iran’s borders.

The rodents were taken into custody 2 weeks ago but few details have emerged about the incident. “I have heard about it, but I do not have precise information,” said the police commander.

Iran has recently stepped up its anti-espionage efforts against the West. There have been no other documented uses of rodents in the past.

The squirrels were arrested? What did Iran do, put them on a reduced nut ration and threaten them with execution by hawk?

And on a related note, are squirrels afforded due process under Iranian law? How long until this turns into a cause for the global squirrel rights community?

I’ve been on vacation and now have some tasks to accomplish before some big shifts. Also re-evaluating how I use the blog. I expect some changes (and a surge of postings), but I can’t predict when.

In a TPMB comparison, an IHT article: In China’s safety woes, echoes of U.S. history.

Like America’s industrializing economy of a century ago, China’s is powered by zealous entrepreneurs who sometimes act like pirates. In both cases there were epidemics of fatal fakes, and regulators too inept, corrupt or hamstrung to do much about it.

The question now is whether Chinese factories, caught exporting poisonous pharmaceutical ingredients, filthy shellfish, bogus pet food and faulty tires, can react in time to head off more damage to their reputations.

Or, to put it another way: are the latest incidents enough to push China toward its own American-style Progressive Era?

China’s internal Core/Gap rule set divide:

Yang said that big Chinese cities have already shown that they can do a better job monitoring food and drug safety than less-developed counties and rural areas can. Retail and restaurant chains and brand-name manufacturers have also gained market share versus small-scale operations, partly because Chinese consumers want to avoid fake or dangerous goods.