As a rule, I really try to avoid basing the core of a post on material behind a subscription wall because it goes against the inclusive character of blogging. Today, however, I simply cannot avoid it.

Stratfor had a fascinating brief this week that gave a concise summary of the past 18 months of militant activity against Nigeria’s oil industry. Not having studied the conflict beyond tracking the stories posted by analysts like Robb and Shloky, I learned a great deal from this summary. I had not, for example, appreciated how President Olusegun Obasanjo’s attempts to engineer a third term for himself had motivated Goodluck Jonathan to help create the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Only rarely have militant attacks disrupted Nigeria’s oil industry on a large scale. After all, if the oil stopped flowing, so would the money the militants ultimately were after. This is what made MEND different…

MEND’s goal was to not just be another militant group after bribes or payoffs (or demanding social justice for Niger Deltans whose livelihoods have failed to benefit from the developing oil sector). The group set out to affect the underlying political order to head off Obasanjo’s third term and make the Delta region a political force to be reckoned with. Thus, not only did the normal taboo against inflicting substantial damage on the oil industry not apply, the damage was the goal. MEND’s logic was that if Obasanjo intended to stay, MEND would demonstrate the price to everyone.

Besides the negative goal of preventing a third term for Obasanjo, MEND also seeks a greater share of oil revune for the Nigerian Delta region.

Nigeria’s president distributes the country’s oil money by a host of informal means; Obasanjo’s impending departure means that an entirely new set of informal means has to be set up, and MEND has no intention of being on the outside for another eight years.

This assessment raises the question of towards what ends Robb’s global guerrillas use their system disruption attacks. Their ends may not be the end of the state itself, but rather an increased role in deciding how the power of the state is used. This raises the question of whether the strategic ends of GGs are actually a hollow state (as predicted by 4GW theory). After all, if the goal is to increase a region’s political power in order to get a larger share of oil revenue, then these goals require a functioning state to survive. They just want to be controlling that functioning state, in order to use it in accordance with their interests.

A possible unintended consequence of GG operational and tactical methods, however, might be unavoidable state failure. The forces of disorder, once unleashed, may be too powerful for MEND to control and may end up creating a failed state (even thought that wasn’t the intent).