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	<title>Comments on: Reforming Pentagon Strategic Decisionmaking</title>
	<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/</link>
	<description>Strategy, Systems Thinking and Military Affairs.</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 04:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>by: Wiggins</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-218</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2007 16:55:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-218</guid>
					<description>Your point about the emphasis an organization places on recruitment and training got me thinking about the follow-on post I need to write to this one regarding how to train and develop intuitive experts.  Lots of connections with Gladwell, Klein and the like here.

~W</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Your point about the emphasis an organization places on recruitment and training got me thinking about the follow-on post I need to write to this one regarding how to train and develop intuitive experts.  Lots of connections with Gladwell, Klein and the like here.</p>
	<p>~W
</p>
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		<title>by: Fabius Maximus</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-214</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2007 22:08:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-214</guid>
					<description>Absolutely agree about the centrality of the incentive structure!  Other factors m/b equally important, however.  

For example, one can tell much about an organization by the time and effort devoted to recruitment and training units.  In the State Dept this has been since WWII a wastebasket (do not know if still so), whereas for the Marines these are high-status jobs.

That's why the key, in my opinion, is understanding how to transform our National Secty apparatus.  Hence perhaps the most important player is MAJ Don Vandergriff, author of The Path to Victory.

Also worth careful attention, imho, is
Drawn extensively on Challenging Transformation’s Clichés, Autulio J. Echevarria II
Strategic Studies Institute
December 2006


http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB746.pdf

Perhaps none of the normal methods of changing organizations will work for us.  If 4GW is so effective, pehaps we need a non-violent varient so that we can use it internally on our own institutions.

As in Andy Grove's advice that organizations should &quot;obsolete themselves.&quot;

</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Absolutely agree about the centrality of the incentive structure!  Other factors m/b equally important, however.  </p>
	<p>For example, one can tell much about an organization by the time and effort devoted to recruitment and training units.  In the State Dept this has been since WWII a wastebasket (do not know if still so), whereas for the Marines these are high-status jobs.</p>
	<p>That&#8217;s why the key, in my opinion, is understanding how to transform our National Secty apparatus.  Hence perhaps the most important player is MAJ Don Vandergriff, author of The Path to Victory.</p>
	<p>Also worth careful attention, imho, is<br />
Drawn extensively on Challenging Transformation’s Clichés, Autulio J. Echevarria II<br />
Strategic Studies Institute<br />
December 2006</p>
	<p><a href='http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB746.pdf' rel='nofollow'>http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB746.pdf</a></p>
	<p>Perhaps none of the normal methods of changing organizations will work for us.  If 4GW is so effective, pehaps we need a non-violent varient so that we can use it internally on our own institutions.</p>
	<p>As in Andy Grove&#8217;s advice that organizations should &#8220;obsolete themselves.&#8221;
</p>
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		<title>by: Wiggins</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-213</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2007 09:37:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-213</guid>
					<description>Hi again Fabius,

I agree with Dr. Richard's point from Certain to Win that many of the problems blamed on a corporation's &quot;culture&quot; can only be fixed by changing the incentive structure.  This is the fundamental change that must occur and it requires committed leaders (I agree with you that such folks are rare).  If the desired behavior is not rewarded, and the wrong behavior punished, then Org chart changes, business process improvements and new personnel won't fix anything.  

cheers,
Wiggins</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Hi again Fabius,</p>
	<p>I agree with Dr. Richard&#8217;s point from Certain to Win that many of the problems blamed on a corporation&#8217;s &#8220;culture&#8221; can only be fixed by changing the incentive structure.  This is the fundamental change that must occur and it requires committed leaders (I agree with you that such folks are rare).  If the desired behavior is not rewarded, and the wrong behavior punished, then Org chart changes, business process improvements and new personnel won&#8217;t fix anything.  </p>
	<p>cheers,<br />
Wiggins
</p>
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		<title>by: Fabius Maximus</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-211</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2007 00:34:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-211</guid>
					<description>Many of the mistakes -- process errors -- by the senior levels of the Bush Admin are almost identical to those made in the 1960's in the Vietnam War.  I suspect that there are deep structural factors at work, not organizational ones.  Just a guess, but if so these solutions will not work.

This effect is commonly seen by attempts to fix weak corporations by changing processes and org charts, when the corporate &quot;culture&quot; is at fault.  Large scale personnel changes accompanied by changes in methods are the only proven ways to fix this.  There are others, such as the re-education by charasmatic leader (as described in &quot;Up the Organization&quot;), but such folks are rare.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Many of the mistakes &#8212; process errors &#8212; by the senior levels of the Bush Admin are almost identical to those made in the 1960&#8217;s in the Vietnam War.  I suspect that there are deep structural factors at work, not organizational ones.  Just a guess, but if so these solutions will not work.</p>
	<p>This effect is commonly seen by attempts to fix weak corporations by changing processes and org charts, when the corporate &#8220;culture&#8221; is at fault.  Large scale personnel changes accompanied by changes in methods are the only proven ways to fix this.  There are others, such as the re-education by charasmatic leader (as described in &#8220;Up the Organization&#8221;), but such folks are rare.
</p>
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		<title>by: Wiggins</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-206</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 18 Feb 2007 19:38:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-206</guid>
					<description>Yes, it's an enormous problem that has existed for more than a decade.  Many of the issues we currently face in areas such as force structure and training can be traced back the paucity of true strategic thinking and planning during the 1990s.

~W</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Yes, it&#8217;s an enormous problem that has existed for more than a decade.  Many of the issues we currently face in areas such as force structure and training can be traced back the paucity of true strategic thinking and planning during the 1990s.</p>
	<p>~W
</p>
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		<title>by: Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-204</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 18 Feb 2007 15:40:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-204</guid>
					<description>&lt;strong&gt;Tom around the web&lt;/strong&gt;

+ NonParty Politics quoted Tom from Hugh's show, and linked transcript 5 and transcript 6, and linked transcript 4 while quoting the Ten Truths. + ZenPundit linked Putin reality check. + So did Observing Japan. + ZenPundit also linked The...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><strong>Tom around the web</strong></p>
	<p>+ NonParty Politics quoted Tom from Hugh&#8217;s show, and linked transcript 5 and transcript 6, and linked transcript 4 while quoting the Ten Truths. + ZenPundit linked Putin reality check. + So did Observing Japan. + ZenPundit also linked The&#8230;
</p>
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		<title>by: A.E</title>
		<link>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-203</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 18 Feb 2007 01:05:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2007/02/16/reforming-pentagon-strategic-decisionmaking/#comment-203</guid>
					<description>It's a serious problem. DoD is a top-down hierarchy in a open source world, and they'll continue to suffer for it. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>It&#8217;s a serious problem. DoD is a top-down hierarchy in a open source world, and they&#8217;ll continue to suffer for it.
</p>
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