Zenpundit has a nice summary of the Small Wars Council discussion that led to Fabuis Maximus’ latest article.

I agree with Mark that an important aspect of Fabius’ article is his attempt to disaggregate general 4GW theory into specific sub-types. Fabius writes that:

As a simple dichotomy for analytical purposes, we can say that 4GW’s come in two types, reflecting the degree of involvement of outside interests (obviously there are many other ways to characterize 4GW).

1. Violence between two or more local groups, who can form from any combination of clans, governments, ethnicities, religions, gangs, and tribes.

2. Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners – both comprising, as above, any imaginable combination of factions.

4GW victories by governments are usually of the first kind, local governments fighting insurgencies. Often foreign assistance is important or even decisive, but the local government leads in such areas as political reform and tactics. Western governments have “won” a few type two insurgencies, but only by assisting the locals – with the locals carrying the primary burden. That is, the foreign interest may lead, but the local government must implement.

Examples of type one insurgencies:

*The WWI Arab Revolt, in which Lawrence of Arabia helped the local Arabs defeat their Turkish rulers.

*The Indonesian insurgencies in West Java and East Timor that Kilcullen studied.

*The victory of the Malaysian colonial government over a communist insurrection (1948 – 1960), during which Malaysia achieved independence from the UK. The British, controlling the information flow to western nations, take full credit for what was more of an assist on their part.

*The apparently successful defensive effort of western nations against al-Qaeda following their early successes in the US and Spain.

One of 4GW theory’s strengths is its focus on the relationship between offense, defense, local actors and foreign actors. As an analytic tool, however, Fabius’ dichotomy requires further refinement. Specifically: how does one define “foreigners?” Type one insurgencies are defined as involving only local groups, yet the first example of a type one insurgency involves Turkish rulers fighting local Arabs. How is this an example of violence between local groups? Wasn’t part of the success of the Arab Revolt due to its ability to rally local Arabs against the foreign rule of the Ottoman Empire?

The issue is how to distinguish the local groups of a type one 4GW from the foreign groups of a type two 4GW. Given the long histories often associated with clashing ethnic groups, some groups that have lived in close geographic proximity for centuries still view each other as interlopers. At what point do foreign occupiers become local factions? If there is not a clear way to do this, then the dichotomy is not yet a useful tool for understanding sub-types of 4GW. We ought to work towards criteria specific enough that they could be coded and tested against a historical data set. Fabius offers a first step (certainly the first of its kind that I’ve encountered). The question now is how do we improve upon it and move forward?