I finally had time to read the Richard Fisher’s article to which Sonny referred me. It contains some interesting examples of Chinese-Iranian cooperation, but that isn’t what motivates my response. Rather it is Fisher’s simplistic portrayal of China’s strategic interests.

Fisher does not explicitly argue that China’s strategic interests collide with ours, yet he tacitly implies this throughout the article. He warns readers that “…Chinese history shows that China looks after what she perceives as her own interests, not those of the United States,” as if this were unique. Of course China looks after her own interests; they are her interests after all! France looks after her interests, England her own, … every country does! Wohlstetter criticized analysts of the 1970s for tautological statements like “it would be dangerous to assume that China won’t resort to violence if she feels that her strategic interests are threatened.” This critique is still relevent.

The question isn’t whether there exist interests that China would aggressively defend; the question is (1) what are those issues and (2) are they contrary to American interests? Fisher remains silent on these question.

China’s foreign policy is not a binary variable that is either aligned with the US or opposed to the US. Fisher warns that “contrary to Western nuclear non-proliferation ‘values’ China has proven it will abet such proliferation to advance its interests,” but America will also bend non-proliferation values to advance its own interests (hello India!). Again, the question comes down to what China’s interests are and the degree to which they are incompatible with our own.

Part 2 will discuss one of China’s fundamental interests, and how it might affect its foreign policy.