Precarious and Intermittent Answers
“…on these complex cardinal questions, answers are won precariously and intermittently, in the course of hard empirical inquiry…”
-Albert Wohlstetter
Sonny weighs in with some good thoughts on the role of theory in strategy:
Neither 4GW, NCW, or EBO deserve a blanket disapproval. Each perspective offers something useful in understanding certain, but not all, aspects of warfare.
Recognizing the uses and limits of a theory remains a challenge for surprisingly many thinkers. I see the uses and limits of 4GW, NCW and EBO as follow:
4GW
-use: recognizes the power of insurgency and unconventional warfare in a globalized environment
-limit: does not consider the relative vulnerability of non-state actors vs. states
NCW
-use: recognizes the importance of common orientation in military capability
-limit: is all too often is used to reduce war to a technological/operations research challenge
EBO
-use: intelligent targeting of structurally complex systems to generate cascading failures. This enables one to disrupt adversary systems with low costs, producing very high returns on investment.
-limit: not applicable to interactively complex systems, i.e. adversaries as a whole.
I like that Sonny characterizes these theories as tools that warfighters use as appropriate to adapt and overcome unexpected challenges. We naturally understand that tools have uses and limits. Theories, on the other hand, tend to activate our combative tendancies. To point to a theory’s limits often provokes the irate defense of its advocates. More theories mean more tools for the warfighter, and I say bring them on.
The next question becomes how do we make sure that officers (and NCOs!) are getting the opportunity to study these theories? Are we leaving it as yet another task for them to take care of in their ever-shrinking free time? Some feel that the problem is systemic, such as Williamson Murry. Writing in the Spring of 2001 he opined that
Thomas Hammes raises similar concerns in last Fall’s Marine Corps Gazette, and offers some ideas for fixing the system.
Ultimately the need is to produce strategic thinkers, something that Gregory Foster believes the US military establishment fails to do:
How do we change the system so that it helps to create more officers like Sonny? Foster says more emphasis on ideas, developed through a proper grounding in classic liberal arts skills such as writing and research. Murry also emphasizes ideas, though he focuses on studying history and encouraging vigorous debate. Hammes, as befits a Marine, focuses on practical and realistic changes in training and promotion guidelines. But the aim is the same.
Wiggins,
Thanks a million for your comments, and the link back to my humble blog. You summarize what I was trying to say, better than myself. I like your bulletized description of 4GW, EBO, and NCW. Years of “death by PowerPoint” briefings unfortunately have accostumed my mind to thinking in term of “bullets”. Again, thank you for taking the time to read my musings. I read OSD regularly, but I actually found out that you had commented on my post through Mark at Zenpundit [1]. I’ll expand on your comments on my blog and link back to yours via my post (and in my blogroll). Mark decribed you as a “Wohlstetterian blogger”. I had to look up who Albert Wohlstetter was. I have to read some of his work. To Williamson Murray’s quote:
“…it is virtually impossible for young officers to find time and opportunity to attain the broad spectrum of historical knowledge, language training, and cultural awareness that the twenty-first century is going to demand.”
I add: some of us spend a big chunk of out time either deployed, getting ready for deployment, or enroute to a deployment. (This is a big reason why I am far behind on my MBA.)I am not whining about this, I love deploying (to an extent) it’s just a fact of life for some of us. A lot of my meager knowledge of history has been gained reading books in airports, PAX terminals, trailers, and tents; not in classrooms. Cultural awareness I have recieved from actually talking (when possible) to Iraqis, Koreans, Colombians, Mexicans, Saudis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, Hondurans, Japanese, Pakistanis, etc, etc…
I have to say something on behalf of my branch, the USAF. Some writers tend to criticize the Air Force for our supposed infatuation with technology. They miss the point in the fact that technology by itself is not the problem, but the misapplication of technology. We can’t go back to flying P-38s, and P-51s, just like I’m sure our critics are not driving Model T’s to go to work. As a matter of fact, our aircraft (although much refurbished) are based on technology that is decades old: B-52 (50 and 60 technology), F-15 (70s and 80s), F-16 (70s and 80s), F-117 (70s and 80s), C-130 (50s and 60s), and so on. Whoever claims that the Predator UAV is “high-tech” does not really know what he is talking about. Like I said, this airframes have been updated with new technolgies, but the basic airframes are still very much the same. We misapplied our technological advantage in Vietnam, and that’s a lesson every Air Force officer and NCO should know by heart.
Ultimately, Sun Tzu (as usual) said it best: “Thus one’s victories in battle cannot be repeated - they take their form in response to inexhaustibly changing circumstances.”
Take care, Wiggins,
Sonny
[1] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/
Comment by Sonny — April 2, 2006 @ 1:10 am
Hi Sonny!
First of all, apologies for the difficulty in commenting. I have the blog set to queue comments that involve links (to avoid the spamming bots) and so when I go a day or two between checking in here a cluster frock like this sometimes happens. I think I’ll change that from now on.
Albert Wohlstetter was, in many ways, THE definitive civilian defense analyst. Mark flatters me by chacertizing my writing as “Wohlstetterian;” my writing only suffers from the comparison ;-). Back in 1952, while working for RAND, he conducted an incredibly influential analysis of SAC doctrine [1]. He was the first to distinguish between “first-strike” and “second-strike” nuclear capabilities. He was responsible for introducing “fail-safe” points. I’d be eager to discuss his work further, and point you to some of his writings. I’ve spent some time researching his life and work, and it is probably clear that I admire both a great deal.
You bring up an angle that my post overlooked - the first hand learning that takes place during deployment through face to face interactions. That sort of full immersion has no substitute and it is incredibly valuable. Replacing any of that with classroom time would be awful.
I may have been guilty of stereotyping the AF as being excessively technology focused in some of my previous posts [2], so I should set the record straight right now: in the course of my modest experience I have met many AF personnel who have a deep and nuanced understanding of the proper role techology ought to play in warfare.
You are clearly a student of strategy and I guess I am curious to what extent you feel that is due to your AF training and to what extent that is due to your own independent efforts. But upon writing that I realize that it may be an impossible question to answer. I guess it reflects my meta-interest in how to train strategic thinkers. What blend of practical experience and theory is the most useful?
I look forward to reading your further thoughts and sincerely thank you for your service.
cheers,
Wiggins
[1] http://www.rand.org/publications/classics/wohlstetter/D1114/D1114.html
[2] http://opposedsystemsdesign.blogsome.com/2006/02/23/fx-flaws/
Comment by Wiggins — April 2, 2006 @ 10:27 pm
Wiggins,
Thanks for responding to my comment. Also, thanks to Mark at Zenpundit for getting the comment to you.
Thanks for the tip on Wohsletter. I am a little embarrassed that I have not heard about him before, particularly since it seems like he was very instrumental in the development of SAC’s doctrine. My excuse: I came in after SAC had already been “disbanded”. We still have STRATCOM though, as you know, but most of SAC’s assets reside now in ACC. Poor excuse, but I tried.
As you well know, there is only so much one can learn from books and in a classroom. My experience with Air Force training is that you learn the foundation in the formal training, but when you get to the field, things are usually adapted to fit the reality of the mission. For example, you can’t necessarily run an operation center in SW Asia, the way you’ll run it in the Korean peninsula. Same doctrinal foundation, different conditions and ways to carry out the mission. I think that our training is second to none, with one caveat. We need to have more incentives for our best guys that are coming back from overseas to go to the schoolhouses without fearing they will not get promoted or that they are going to get bogged down in an overtly beaureucratized “teaching job”.
Like I said, Air Force training is great, but I consider myself a perpetual student. The little I know is through a combination of formal training and reading on my own. Also, I’ve spent nearly half of my time overseas. I think that, generally, you learn in one year overseas, what other people learn in a regular 2-3 year assigment back in the states. I also underwent a transformation of sorts when I was for several months in a very austere deployment where all I was doing was working, exercising, and reading. Theory is great, but you have to see how things work in the real world. Ideally we would have an assigment system where people went: training, field, teach…or something like that. They say that no battle plan survives contact with the enemy, sometimes not theory survives contact with actual human beings. Doctrine and theory should serves us, not the other way around. I think that we are going to come out of this war better strategists. We made many mistakes at the beginning, but I think we are learning just like we learned a lot after Vietnam. (Not that Iraq is the same as Vietnam) I am more worried about the civilians that will be in charge of the military. We follow orders from civilians, which is how it should be, but brilliant operations and tactics cannot save a doomed strategy.
Thanks for putting my blog in your blogroll.
I’ll be glad to keep the discussion. Thanks for putting my blog in your blog roll. We need to keep the discussion sometime. Right now, I have to catch a plane. Thank God for wireless and laptops. Sorry for the mispellings. I was typing in a hurry. Take care,
Sonny
Comment by Sonny — April 4, 2006 @ 2:06 am
I look forward to continuing the discussion. Your comment that “no theory survives contact with actual human beings” is heavy with significance. Connections to Wohlstetter’s criticism of SAC for only considering “Western-preferred Soviet strategies,” and Chet Richard’s first law of competition (The intelligence of your opponents is >= to your intelligence). More on that later, gotta run now.
Safe travels,
Wiggins
Comment by Wiggins — April 4, 2006 @ 3:48 pm