“…on these complex cardinal questions, answers are won precariously and intermittently, in the course of hard empirical inquiry…”
-Albert Wohlstetter

Sonny weighs in with some good thoughts on the role of theory in strategy:

One of the things that can weigh us down in dealing with today’s conflicts is an unnecessary attachment to a single theory or doctrine of war, be it EBO, NCW, or 4GW. No single theory or perspective can explain the totality and all the phenomena associated with what is perhaps the most complicated of human endeavors: war…

Neither 4GW, NCW, or EBO deserve a blanket disapproval. Each perspective offers something useful in understanding certain, but not all, aspects of warfare.

Recognizing the uses and limits of a theory remains a challenge for surprisingly many thinkers. I see the uses and limits of 4GW, NCW and EBO as follow:

4GW
-use: recognizes the power of insurgency and unconventional warfare in a globalized environment
-limit: does not consider the relative vulnerability of non-state actors vs. states

NCW
-use: recognizes the importance of common orientation in military capability
-limit: is all too often is used to reduce war to a technological/operations research challenge

EBO
-use: intelligent targeting of structurally complex systems to generate cascading failures. This enables one to disrupt adversary systems with low costs, producing very high returns on investment.
-limit: not applicable to interactively complex systems, i.e. adversaries as a whole.

I like that Sonny characterizes these theories as tools that warfighters use as appropriate to adapt and overcome unexpected challenges. We naturally understand that tools have uses and limits. Theories, on the other hand, tend to activate our combative tendancies. To point to a theory’s limits often provokes the irate defense of its advocates. More theories mean more tools for the warfighter, and I say bring them on.

The next question becomes how do we make sure that officers (and NCOs!) are getting the opportunity to study these theories? Are we leaving it as yet another task for them to take care of in their ever-shrinking free time? Some feel that the problem is systemic, such as Williamson Murry. Writing in the Spring of 2001 he opined that

…it is virtually impossible for young officers to find time and opportunity to attain the broad spectrum of historical knowledge, language training, and cultural awareness that the twenty-first century is going to demand. The officer corps of the U.S. armed services are therefore likely become ever more narrowly technological and less capable of adapting and innovating in the face of diverse threats and emerging challenges.

Thomas Hammes raises similar concerns in last Fall’s Marine Corps Gazette, and offers some ideas for fixing the system.

Ultimately the need is to produce strategic thinkers, something that Gregory Foster believes the US military establishment fails to do:

By the time officers reach senior rank, they have been thoroughly schooled in what to think, yet poorly prepared in how to think. And if they have spent the staff time expected of most officers by this stage in their career, they will
have fully internalized distinctly antirational thought processes of successful bureaucratic and political advocacy.

How do we change the system so that it helps to create more officers like Sonny? Foster says more emphasis on ideas, developed through a proper grounding in classic liberal arts skills such as writing and research. Murry also emphasizes ideas, though he focuses on studying history and encouraging vigorous debate. Hammes, as befits a Marine, focuses on practical and realistic changes in training and promotion guidelines. But the aim is the same.