In the vein of accurately evaluating threats to the United States, I’m going to address some important articles I have read recently regarding China.

Starting with Miinxin Pei’s recent article in Foreign Policy, we get a reminder of the precarious nature of the Chinese economy - particularly the banking sector:

Its banking system, which costs Beijing about 30 percent of annual GDP in bailouts, is saddled with nonperforming loans and is probably the most fragile in Asia…
According to official data for 2003, the state directly accounted for 38 percent of the country’s GDP and employed 85 million people (about one third of the urban workforce)…
China is the only country in history to have simultaneously achieved record economic growth and a record number of nonperforming bank loans.
The Chinese central bank’s research shows that politically directed lending was responsible for 60 percent of bad bank loans in 2001–02. The problem persists today.

This is a danger I have been following with Stratfor for more than a year now; it is good to see it picked up on a non-subscription article. Now, Barnett counters that any market economy (especially an emerging market economy) will have some sort of unsettling stats like this. He wants to see context. The context, of course, of the elite’s interest in keeping the gravy train running because it is the only thing assuring their hold on power now that Maoism has been dropped. The question isn’t whether economic reforms will make the ruling elite willing to part with power, as Pei implies, but whether economic reforms will empower a population sufficiently to push the ruling elite out of power. This is the key assumption of the “markets lead to democracy” claim. China may be richer (at nearly $1500 per capita income) than many poor democracies, but is there a per capita income that cannot be exceeded without becoming a democracy? That is the key question.

Jumping over to Robb for a moment, he interprets the evidence in Pei’s article as a sign that China is extremely vulnerable to systems disruptions. This implies that Taiwan could use system disruptions as a way to counter an attempted invasion across the Taiwan Straight. In a peculiar way, this dovetails with Barnett’s argument that we ought to drop our security guarantee with Taiwan because it is the only remaining flash point that could draw us into a military conflict with China - who we ought to be developing a strategic partnership with instead (just like we are with India). If Robb is correct, then Taiwan doesn’t need the American security guantee anymore for its own safety, making the strategic trade-off even easier.

But would the Chinese government recognize Taiwan’s ability to counter military force with system disruptions? Which brings us to the old question of what is really going on in heads of Chinese policy makers. There are some who feel that China is developing an entire range of sha shou jian (roughly “assassin’s mace”) weapons to counter high tech militaries. But towards what end would China use these weapons? Enter David Lai’s excellent article, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi.” Lai argues that in order to better understand the Chinese, and to improve our own military capabilities, we ought to study the ancient game of go.

The question is whether the Chinese way is worth learning. After all, as a popular saying in the West goes, with a superior force, a lousy general can win a war. As long as the United States and the West maintain their capability edge, they have nothing to worry about. The answer from this author, as this monograph has built the case, is a resounding yes.
…ever since warfare came into being… it has been a contest of physical force as well as wits. In the evolution of warfare, the battle of wits has become more important than the actual use of force to achieve war aims (political goals). Today, we call the battle of wits, “strategy.” It is about the ways to use force. The United States is the most powerful country in force capability terms, but less so in resourcefulness. The Chinese way of war and diplomacy can be a great suppliment to American power. If one looks at American power as the yang (the upfront force) and the Chinese strategems as the yin (the behind-the-scenes wits), it is only natural that the two should complement each other. The Chinese are determined to improve their capabilities; American should improve their strategies and strategems.

I like that Lin is able to consider the differences between Western and Eastern perspectives without flying into vague assertions of “Chinese strategic secrets” or the inscrutable nature of the Eastern way of war. I started playing go precisely because I wanted to develop my strategic thinking and the attrition-centric perspective of chess was insufficient. I highly encourage you to read Lai’s article in its entirety, it is exactly the kind of concrete, insightful and balanced perspective we need when considering China.

Personally, I feel that Barnett’s “strategic partnership” route is the proper way to go. It does not have to start off as an explicit, written partnership, just as the UK-US partnership that began after the War of 1812 was tacit. In fact, the UK’s post-1815 response to rising American power serves as an excellent reference point in considering how to respond to China’s rise. We ought to avoid hyperbole and paranoia and stop using China as the neo-USSR bogeyman who justifies buying high tech weapons. In order to do this we need to see clearly and understand the Chinese, and playing go is a great way to get started. Find your local chapter of the American Go Association and go to a beginner’s night. You’ll probably have some good fun. And as you learn, you’ll start referring to go as a metaphor for strategic interactions, just as Americans commonly use poker, chess and football.