InsideDefense (subscription required) gives an update on the war planning strategy for the 2006 QDR:

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, which is nearly complete, is expected to include a modest adjustment to the force planning construct established in the 2001 QDR — including fewer changes than some senior Pentagon officials had been seeking.

“The new construct will just be a refinement of ‘1-4-2-1,’” said a Pentagon official involved in the review today.

The “1-4-2-1” force planning construct, set forth in the 2001 QDR, called for the Defense Department to defend the United States (1); maintain forces capable of deterring aggression in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and Southwest Asia/ Middle East (4); be ready to simultaneously combat aggression in two of these regions (2); and maintain a capability to “win decisively” in one of these two conflicts (1).

The “1-4-2-1″ construct is a lame reinterpretation of the old “two major regional conflicts” paradigm with was really just a reinterpretation of the really old “beat the Soviets” paradigm. To be fair, there has been a change in emphasis over the past 15 years, but the bureaucratic inertia is incredible here. In many ways, there is still a Soviet-sized hole in the DoD’s planning structure.

To see this, let’s consider the folly of the “2-1″ portion of “1-4-2-1.” We want a Leviathan able to fight in two regions at once but we only want a SysAdmin able to stablize one region. This is incoherent. We cannot consider the two forces sperately; they are inexorable interrelated! One of the most compelling deterrents our Leviathan faces is our inability to field a second-half team (that will allow us to “win decisively”). For eample, right now a good deal of our Leviathan force is tied up in Iraq, due to our lack of a SysAdmin capability. To speak of “combating aggression” and “wining decisively” as seperate missions is a great recipe for confusing the hell out of ourselves. One of Iraq’s legacies will be an unwillingness to use the Leviathan without a clear plan for the aftermath - i.e. a capable SysAdmin effort to clean up after the trigger-pullers. There is no “2-1.” It must be either “2-2″ or “1-1.” Anything in between is doubletalk for “we want to sound impressive but we aren’t willing to make the actual changes to be impressive.”

*Deep breath*

To be fair, an allied SysAdmin force that could pick up the slack to bring America’s “2-1″ up to a “2-2.” Which would be in keeping with Dr. Barnett’s “America supplies the Leviathan, the Core provides the SysAdmin” paradigm. But if our Leviathan is going to be relying upon our allies’ capabilities that much, we had better be clear about that and make sure they get the memo.

This is disappointing. I expect more vision. We need more vision.

Faster. Please.